The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials

Оглавление

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION. Theme 1. THE STUDY OF MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS

Theme 2. RUSSIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY: ITS SELF-IMAGE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, AND CONTRADICTIONS OF ITS DEVELOPMENT

Theme 3. FESTIVAL OF THE OPPRESSED OR SOCIAL DISEASE? THE NATURE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS

Theme 4. EMERGENCY MEASURES AND THE «EXTREME EMERGENCY REGIME» IN THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND OTHER STATE FORMATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIA, 1918‒1920

Theme 5. FROM «WAR COMMUNISM» TO THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY: CONTRADICTIONS OF THE NEP

Theme 6. NEP DOWNSIZING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLICY OF EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES INTO A PERMANENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Theme 7. THE 1930S: CRISES, REFORMS, REPRESSIONS

Theme 8. THE HIERARCHY OF THE GREAT TERROR

Theme 9. ILLUSIONS AND AWAKENING OF THE GENERATION OF 1930S

Theme 10. THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941‒1945: MAIN EVENTS AND POPULAR MOOD IN THE UNOCCUPIED SOVIET UNION

Theme 11. THE PEOPLE AND PROBLEMS OF THE POST-WAR ERA

Theme 12. THE KHRUSHCHEV’S THAW AND ITS REVERSE SIDE

Theme 13. SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES: FROM REFORMS TO STAGNATION

Theme 14. THE 1980S: THE SPACE OF POWER AND A SEARCH FOR NEW WAYS OF HISTORICAL PROGRESS

Theme 15. AUGUST PUTSCH OF 1991 AND THE TERMIDOR OF YELTSIN

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA. WITH WHAT DOES RUSSIA ENTER THE NEW MILLENNIUM?. Theme 16. THE REALM OF POWER UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN

Theme 17. REFORMS AND THE HIERARCHY OF NATIONAL PROJECTS

Theme 18. LOCATING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD OF 1917 IN RUSSIAN HISTORICAL MEMORY

Theme 19. THE GREAT VICTORY OF 1945 IN HISTORICAL MEMORY

Theme 20. TWENTIETH-CENTURY RUSSIAN UTOPIAS: ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE AS IMAGINED BY THE STATE AND DESIRED BY THE INTELLIGENTSIA

MAIN EVENTS, DATES AND GLOSSARY

SELECTED BIOGRAPHIES

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Theme 17.
REFORMS AND THE HIERARCHY OF NATIONAL PROJECTS

Vladimir Putin’s presidency will be remembered for a number of stabilization measures that prevented the total atomization of national institutions, as well as for efforts to effectively reform political, economic and social aspects of life. The reforms were aimed at coordinating the market economy and government policy, neutralizing the negative consequences of privatization, promoting the social components of government policy, and closing the divides in our society and providing for its further consolidation. The reform processes, whether individual special-purpose projects or large-scale national projects, have embraced different sides of Russian life, bringing hundreds of modernization programs under one roof.

Originally, reforms were planned as a complex measures to influence the most difficult areas in crisis and to develop some legislative and organizational basics that had not been introduced to the fundamental principles of Russian state organization in the 1990s. The campaign required particular social and political conditions. It could not be engaged in the atmosphere of deep crisis that characterised the country during last months of Yeltsin’s presidency. That’s why Putin did not declare any reform projects during his first year as president and took only the most necessary steps to establish order at a basic level, to terminate the most immediate threats to national security and to provide for the territorial integrity of the country. As a result, in general the situation stabilized during the year 2000. The morale of society significantly improved. The need to undertake long-term state development projects was becoming more and more evident. In this atmosphere the government started implementing priority reforms. All the reforms of Putin’s presidency can be divided into two groups: centralization reforms (all aimed at constructing a vertical power structure, though they influenced different aspects of social life) and streamlining reforms (implemented to improve the State machinery, to simplify certain institutions and to make them more efficient at the same time).

On May 13, 2000 Putin proposed the creation of seven federal districts, appointing a president’s plenipotentiary representative to each of them. This increased the president’s influence over regional leaders. The Kremlin got an opportunity to react to the events in the regions of Russian Federation more rapidly. On May 17, 2000, Putin introduced a new procedure for organizing the Upper Chamber of the legislature. This initiative was soon called a reform of the Federation Council. The president was concerned about the evident abuse of fundamental legal principles: the Federation Council consisted of governors, who represented executive power in their regions while being members of a legislative structure on the federal level. The president could not help describing the situation as totally absurd. He proposed a new procedure: the governors were to send their representatives to the Federation Council.

At the same time the president announced that he would dismiss heads of regions and regional legislative assemblies that passed any legislation contradicting federal laws. He affirmed his right to dismiss the head of any region, but he guaranteed that these authorities had the same right towards authorities of lower levels.

The public announcement of certain measures concerning cooperation between the center and the regions became the first important step in the sequence of Kremlin reforms, aimed first of all at reducing the excessive power of regional leaders.

The idea of consolidating Russia’s regions was another element of the campaign for national centralization and for minimizing the socio-economic gap in the development of Russian regions. This idea also emerged in the Kremlin in 2000, but only in 2003 was it backed up by some practical organizational measures: a referendum on consolidation of the Perm region with Komi-Permiatskii autonomous district was held (the consolidation itself was formally announced two years later). In October 2005, a referendum on the consolidation of Kamchatskaya region and Koryakskii autonomous district took place (on July 1, 2007, the united Kamchatskii krai appeared on the map of the Russian Federation).

In 2004, however, Putin made the most decisive step to limit the omnipotence of regional leaders: after the Beslan terrorist act in North Ossetia he introduced to the State Duma a draft law on the abolition of gubernatorial elections (September 27). The law swiftly passed all legislative levels and was ratified before the end of the year with almost no objections from governors. This measure promoted administrative, territorial and political centralization of the country. The abolition of gubernatorial elections was the final step in the transfer of power and complete responsibility to the president.

Meanwhile centralization of the political sphere went on; the party sector in particular underwent some changes. A number of amendments were introduced into the law «On political parties»: the minimum number of party members was set at fifty thousand; every party was to have offices in at least fifty regions of the country with the minimum of 500 people in each office. Later on a seven percent barrier for federal and regional legislative elections was introduced. The reform was opposed by the opposition as an abuse of democracy, though in fact it was a strategic centralization to minimize political risks. Besides their primary objectives, these steps were also taken to streamline the reforms in a context in which the country was virtually running on autopilot.

Tax reform was carried out between 2000 and 2002. In 2001, the tax rate for individuals was reduced to 13%; so-called «turnover taxes» were abrogated. A sliding social tax was introduced (basic rate at 35.6%). In 2002, the tax on organizations’ income was reduced to 24%. Tax reforms did not always result in the simplification of the tax system, though this was the aim stated at the beginning. However, certain groups of tax-payers, small businesses and agricultural producers in particular (special tax treatments were introduced for them), were pleased with the situation.

The state turned its attention not just to the reforms themselves, but also to the modernization of the legal code. On February 1, 2002, the new Labor Code of the Russian Federation replaced the Soviet Labor Code that had existed for almost thirty years.

Thorough reforms of the pension system began in January 2002. A distributive pension payment principle was replaced with an accumulative principle. Three principal federal laws on the national pension plan came into force in December 2003: «On the governmental pension plan in the Russian Federation,» «On obligatory pension insurance in the Russian Federation,» and «On labor pensions in the Russian Federation.» Though the reform process was justly criticized in a number of respects, the reform itself proved the government’s intentions to streamline the system and to make it effective.

Significant changes in the education system were planned. The society’s attitude to the matter was ambivalent. On the one hand people regularly criticized any innovation and praised the Soviet system of education. On the other hand everyone agreed that the quality and accessibility of education needed improvement. The reforms, developed by the government for this area, included the introduction of a unified state exam, 12 year school education and other innovations; yet often even those who were to implement and promote these innovations did not understand their essence and benefits.

An effort was made to reform the military sphere — the most conservative part of the state. The necessity of modernization was voiced even in Yeltsin’s time. But nobody was too eager to actually pursue the aims declared. The government’s activity in this area faced serious obstacles. The effort to popularize contract military service made it clear that for the moment it was impossible to staff the army on a contract basis only. The law on alternative service was a result of a compromise between the government, which tried to satisfy the society’s demands, and the generals, who were worried about the problem of manning military units. Finally, the idea of alternative civilian service resulted in the adoption of a useless law, which in fact provided no real alternative. The step-by-step reduction of the term of army service should be viewed as a positive measure: the term of military service was reduced to one and a half years from January 1, 2007, and to one year from January 1, 2008. The financial well-being of the military was attended to closely: salaries were significantly increased, and a number of steps to solve housing problems were made.

История Bordyugov G., Devyatov S., Kotelenet E. The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials

История Bordyugov G., Devyatov S., Kotelenet E. The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials

The XXth Century Political History of Russia presents lecture materials for academics working with undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students as well as researchers of Russian history.<br /> The chapters are an unusual insight into the Russian past, which makes the readers think, analyze and also reconsider some events of the Russian history. It is an exciting blend of stories of the past and future trends, allowing to make forecasts and predictions.

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