The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials

Оглавление

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION. Theme 1. THE STUDY OF MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS

Theme 2. RUSSIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY: ITS SELF-IMAGE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, AND CONTRADICTIONS OF ITS DEVELOPMENT

Theme 3. FESTIVAL OF THE OPPRESSED OR SOCIAL DISEASE? THE NATURE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS

Theme 4. EMERGENCY MEASURES AND THE «EXTREME EMERGENCY REGIME» IN THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND OTHER STATE FORMATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIA, 1918‒1920

Theme 5. FROM «WAR COMMUNISM» TO THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY: CONTRADICTIONS OF THE NEP

Theme 6. NEP DOWNSIZING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLICY OF EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES INTO A PERMANENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Theme 7. THE 1930S: CRISES, REFORMS, REPRESSIONS

Theme 8. THE HIERARCHY OF THE GREAT TERROR

Theme 9. ILLUSIONS AND AWAKENING OF THE GENERATION OF 1930S

Theme 10. THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941‒1945: MAIN EVENTS AND POPULAR MOOD IN THE UNOCCUPIED SOVIET UNION

Theme 11. THE PEOPLE AND PROBLEMS OF THE POST-WAR ERA

Theme 12. THE KHRUSHCHEV’S THAW AND ITS REVERSE SIDE

Theme 13. SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES: FROM REFORMS TO STAGNATION

Theme 14. THE 1980S: THE SPACE OF POWER AND A SEARCH FOR NEW WAYS OF HISTORICAL PROGRESS

Theme 15. AUGUST PUTSCH OF 1991 AND THE TERMIDOR OF YELTSIN

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA. WITH WHAT DOES RUSSIA ENTER THE NEW MILLENNIUM?. Theme 16. THE REALM OF POWER UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN

Theme 17. REFORMS AND THE HIERARCHY OF NATIONAL PROJECTS

Theme 18. LOCATING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD OF 1917 IN RUSSIAN HISTORICAL MEMORY

Theme 19. THE GREAT VICTORY OF 1945 IN HISTORICAL MEMORY

Theme 20. TWENTIETH-CENTURY RUSSIAN UTOPIAS: ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE AS IMAGINED BY THE STATE AND DESIRED BY THE INTELLIGENTSIA

MAIN EVENTS, DATES AND GLOSSARY

SELECTED BIOGRAPHIES

Для бесплатного чтения доступна только часть главы! Для чтения полной версии необходимо приобрести книгу

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA. WITH WHAT DOES RUSSIA ENTER THE NEW MILLENNIUM?

Theme 16.
THE REALM OF POWER UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN

The Putin era was a difficult period where modernizing and mobilizing trends were mixed together in the realm of power in quite a contradictory way. The President once confessed that «life as a whole consists of contradictions. When contradictions end, the abyss begins.» This abyss was in sight on the eve of Putin’s appointment as Prime Mi­nister eight years ago. Even the most irreconcilable Kremlin critics describe the situation at the time in similar terms, the most common phrase being «the eight lost years.» The difference in evaluative measures when comparing the years 1999 and 2007 is obvious. It is definitively clear that Putin’s presidency was not a period of degradation, but the one of progress, in which Russia overcame the crisis of the 1990s. Instead of moving in a downward spiral, Russia gained a new level of historical development under Putin.

Initially, Putin’s agenda linking contrasting goals looked ambiguous. On the one hand, he intended to stop the country’s break-up and establish order in the state, which inevitably involved mobilizing actions. On the other hand, he was supposed to ensure a sustainable and predictable existence, albeit not the most elevated one, to guarantee to a people exhausted by the 1990s a life without disturbances. In light of such expectations, even the most well-balanced and measured application of mobilizing techniques turned out to be extremely troublesome.

One may object that throughout Russian history there have never been suitable circumstances for mobilization. It has always been used as an extreme and desperate means to lead the country out of recurrent crises. People who survived the hardships of a mobilizing sprint were exhausted by the very crisis they were striving to overcome. And again in the late 1990s, people longed for stability, not for new pressures and the inevitable concentration of resources and efforts that those pressures entailed.

It is true that at first sight the situation at the turn of the 21st century was not unusual for Russia — but only at first sight. Unlike all periods in the lead up to a major mobilization effort, Russian society entered the millennium not only tired of exhausting changes, but actually deprived of any motivating ideology for such an effort. The previous communist ideology was discredited during the «era of stagnation,» and was therefore rejected; however, no substitute was offered. The only motivation on offer was a cynical and immoral call, in a poor and struggling country, for personal enrichment, which was raised to the status of a new religion by a strong and aggressive mass media controlled by the existing elite.

Even during the hardest times of its past — during the Time of Troubles at the beginning of 17th century and in the period of the dissolution of the monarchy and the ensuing period of hardship — people at least had their faith. In the first case they had faith in a divinely blessed Holy Russia, and in the second they believed in the new religion of Bolshevism. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency the public consciousness lost its motivation completely. The people did not have any image of the future. Strong apathy and indifference were gnawing at a society that seemed to be witnessing its possible disappearance as a historical subject. Russian society looked on with indifference at a new round of state disintegration in the North Caucasus in 1999.

It was clear that in such a moral and psychological climate, mobilization was impossible. Therefore, Putin had to elaborate a carefully calibrated and deliberate political program which would involve a minimal range of mobilization techniques. The social discomfort caused by these techniques would have to be offset by mechanisms to optimize the functioning of the system as a whole. Since the Russian elites, including those closely bound to Yeltsin’s Kremlin, preferred limited mobilization, the task became substantially simpler.

However, the real range of Putin’s powers was quite limited. Yeltsin handed him a set of personnel consisting of people from «The Family,» as members of the inner circle of the former president were known. «The Family» was to guarantee the continuation of the political course under the new Kremlin leader, i.e. to control Putin so that he did not disrupt the system of interests set up by his predecessor concerning the key political, oligarchic and lobbying groups. They were also supposed to restrict Putin’s political activity to two issues: establishing order in Chechnya and the final elimination of the serious coalition, consisting of federal and regional elites, which formed the electoral bloc «Fatherland — All Russia» during the state Duma elections in 1999.

Putin was supposed to rule the country as a regime of controlled (by «The Family») Bonapartism. Meanwhile, the cumulative effect of a whole range of factors (such as the extreme popularity of the new president; the common negative attitude toward the state itself and its institutions; the continuing conflicts between elite and corporate groups in legal and illicit business; the slow federalization of the regions of the Russian Federation; and the generally unfavorable socio-economic situation for many people) allowed Putin to consolidate his power despite the narrow range of possibilities.

During the first months of Putin’s presidency, the Chechen counterterrorist operation was the single and at the same time most efficient way to consolidate his influence as the new head of state.

In contrast to the first Chechen campaign in 1994–1996, which looked more like one of the Kremlin’s political-technological operations (with its constant reconciliation with separatists, the preservation of their complex financial infrastructure and information network in the biggest cities of the country, and so on), the authorities not only did not interfere with the counterterrorist operation begun in August, 1999 — first in Dagestan and then in Chechnya — but also rendered genuine support. The groups lobbying for the separatists’ interests were liquidated, meanwhile people were provided with appropriate information and propaganda. Such a unified position was definitely the result of the consensus between Putin and the main elite groupings. The consensus was unique in the power structure, and despite the fact that it concerned only one single issue, Putin took advantage of it. Enjoying success in the North Caucasus, he intended to launch long needed reforms in other critical fields of public life.

История Bordyugov G., Devyatov S., Kotelenet E. The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials

История Bordyugov G., Devyatov S., Kotelenet E. The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials

The XXth Century Political History of Russia presents lecture materials for academics working with undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students as well as researchers of Russian history.<br /> The chapters are an unusual insight into the Russian past, which makes the readers think, analyze and also reconsider some events of the Russian history. It is an exciting blend of stories of the past and future trends, allowing to make forecasts and predictions.

Внимание! Авторские права на книгу "The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials" (Bordyugov G., Devyatov S., Kotelenet E.) охраняются законодательством!